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Abstract
Roman Catholic scholar Josef Pieper has suggested that the Protestant teaching of salvation by
grace alone promotes a type of false assurance that undermines the necessity of striving for
Christlikeness in the lives of Christians. Protestants do sometimes sound as if justifĳication and
sanctifĳication are identical therefore downplaying the importance of good works and the pilgrim
character of the Christian life. Nonetheless, a proper understanding of the distinction between
justifĳication and sanctifĳication maintains both the Reformation emphasis on grace and a robust
place for human striving toward sanctifĳication in cooperation with the Holy Spirit. Furthermore,
the Thomist tradition’s understanding of the theological virtues, as interpreted by Pieper, has the
potential to offfer a category for understanding the striving of sanctifĳication as the fĳitting action of
one with the disposition of hope.
Keywords
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Introduction
The Thomist tradition understands hope as a theological virtue. Thomas Aquinas describes virtue as that “which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise.”1 Thus, any time we see a human action which fĳits these two criteria,
according to Aquinas, we see a virtue. Josef Pieper fleshes this out a bit. He says,
“Virtue means the steadfastness of man’s orientation toward the realization of
his nature, that is, toward good.”2 The “good,” in the case of the theological
virtues, is happiness or blessedness in God himself. Terence Penelhum writes,

1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (S.T. in future citations), II-II, 17, 1.
2 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 99.
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“It is he [God] in whom we believe in in [sic] faith, have confĳidence in in hope,
and love in charity.”3
Pieper discusses the importance of virtue for the Christian life in his book,
Faith, Hope, Love. In his treatment of the virtue of hope, he identifĳies the two
ways in which hope can falter: despair and presumption. He further identifĳies
two distinct forms of presumption. According to Pieper, the fĳirst sort of presumption “is characterized by the more or less explicit thesis that man is able
by his own human nature to win eternal life and the forgiveness of sins.”4 In
short, Pieper describes what some might explain as salvation by works. If one
is a pretty good person and lives a morally upright life by human standards but
apart from reliance on God and God’s grace, that person can expect to enjoy
life in the presence of God. Pieper associates this with Pelagius.5
The second form of presumption that Pieper identifĳies has to do with what
he calls “premature certainty” regarding salvation.6 He associates this sort of
presumption with the “heresy propagated by the Reformation,” that is, “the
sole efffĳicacy of God’s redemptive and engracing action.”7 He writes:
By teaching the absolute certainty of salvation solely by virtue of the merits of Christ,
this heresy destroys the true pilgrim character of Christian existence by making as certain for the individual Christian as the revealed fact of redemption the belief that he
had already “actually” achieved the goal of salvation.8

Pieper suggests that the Protestant notion of salvation by grace promotes a
type of false assurance that one has achieved the goal that is in reality a promised future good. The danger is that if one thinks she has this future good in
hand, what need is there to strive toward it? To put it diffferently, what is the
point of striving to be like Christ if the goal of salvation has already been
attained?

3 Terence Penelhum, “The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas,” Religious Studies 13 ( June
1977): 134.
4 Pieper, 126.
5 Pieper, Faith, 126.
6 Pieper, Faith, 126.
7 Pieper, Faith, 126.
8 Pieper, Faith, 126-7. Pieper really has two concerns here. First, he is concerned that an
overemphasis on grace based on the merits of Christ will lead to lack of striving in sanctifĳication.
Second, he is concerned with what in Reformed circles would be understood as the assurance of
salvation sometimes formulated as the perseverance of the saints. (Canons of Dort, fĳifth head of
doctrine) This essay is will address only the fĳirst concern.
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Pieper’s concern is well worth considering. Protestants at times do sound as
if salvation and justifĳication are identical and, as a result, downplay the necessity of the work of sanctifĳication in the life of a Christian.9 Nonetheless, a proper
understanding of the Reformed theological distinction between justifĳication
and sanctifĳication within the broader category of salvation by grace does not
undermine the pilgrim character of the Christian life. This essay will demonstrate that such an understanding maintains both the Reformation emphasis
on grace alone as well as a robust place for human striving toward sanctifĳication in cooperation with the Holy Spirit. With a clear understanding of the relationship between justifĳication and sanctifĳication in hand, this essay will further
demonstrate how the theological virtue of hope as understood in the Thomist
tradition has the potential to offfer a category for understanding the striving of
sanctifĳication not as a regression toward Pelagianism as some Protestants
might fear, but as the fĳitting action of one with the disposition of hope.

Salvation by Grace
It is not particularly difffĳicult to understand why Pieper identifĳies certain Protestant notions of salvation by grace with the danger of presumption and the corresponding lack of striving that accompanies that disposition. In part, Pieper is
simply reflecting a historic Roman Catholic understanding of the teaching of
the Reformers. The Council of Trent makes clear that “vain and ungodly confĳidence” in the forgiveness of sins opposes the true teaching of the church.10 It
furthermore states that “no one ought to flatter himself with faith alone, thinking that by faith alone he is made an heir and will obtain the inheritance.”11 The
Roman Catholic church was concerned that the Reformer’s teaching of sola
fĳides would undermine the necessity for right living, for good works. In fact, to
teach the assurance of one’s justifĳication apart from works is anathema. Canon
9 asserts, “If anyone says that the sinner is justifĳied by faith alone, meaning that
nothing else is required to cooperate in order to obtain the grace of justifĳication, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be prepared and disposed
9 This seems to be true at the practical, lay level if not specifĳically taught in the theologies of
various Protestant denominations. See for example N.T. Wright, Justifĳication (Downer’s Grove:
IVP, 2009), 11; John Stott, The Cross of Christ (Downer’s Grove: IVP, 1986), 188.
10 Council of Trent, Ch. IX, http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/trent06.htm, accessed
5-8-12.
11 Council of Trent, Ch. XI, http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/trent06.htm, accessed
5-8-12.
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by the action of his own will, let him be anathema.”12 From the Roman Catholic
point of view, the Reformers consider works of the law as optional with respect
to one’s salvation. In addition, some of the reformer’s literature from the Reformation era and beyond is inconsistent in the use of terminology associated
with salvation and could therefore be misleading.13 Clarifying the historical
Reformed distinction between justifĳication and sanctifĳication will help alleviate this misunderstanding.
While Reformed thought does distinguish between justifĳication and sanctifĳication in a way that is diffferent from Roman Catholic teaching, both doctrines are considered necessary aspects of salvation, the overarching category.
In other words, one cannot separate justifĳication from sanctifĳication or suggest
that a person might be justifĳied and not sanctifĳied. John Stott notes that some
of the ambiguity with regard to exactly where to divide justifĳication and sanctifĳication is not even clear in the biblical text.14 Nonetheless, Stott, in accordance with the Protestant tradition overall, afffĳirms the importance of keeping
the distinction in tact.15
In Protestant understanding, justifĳication is God’s declaration that sinful
human persons are righteous by virtue of faith in Christ’s work on their behalf.
12 Council of Trent, Canon 9, http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/trent06.htm, accessed
5-8-12. See also Canon 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 24.
13 See for example the Belgic Confession article 22, one of the confessional standards used by
many Reformed churches, where “salvation” and “justifĳication” seem to be used synonymously.
While this is clarifĳied in the succeeding articles, 23 and 24, if all one did was read article 22, it is
fairly easy to see how the confusion could arise. Of course, a hesitance on the part of the Reformers
to speak about striving, even with sanctifĳication, is understandable given the insecurity fostered
by late medieval Roman Catholic piety which overemphasized striving and underemphasized
assurance of salvation, a piety against which the Reformers were reacting. See for example, Carter
Lindberg, The European Reformation, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 58-70. The tradition of speaking
about an “order of salvation” may also have contributed to the confusion. While the order was
understood as a logical order, it is sometimes misunderstood by clergy and lay people to be a
temporal order. Thus, one could conceive of justifĳication without sanctifĳication. In addition, a
number of antinomian movements did arise in the wake of the Reformation. While these tended
to be fringe movements and not part of mainstream thought at the time, the fact that some took
the Reformation teaching of justifĳication by faith to negate the necessity of good works in the life
of a Christian likely fueled Roman Catholic sentiments regarding the danger of this teaching.
There is also confusion in some contemporary literature about the meaning of “imputation” with
respect to the righteousness of Christ. The way some authors frame this doctrine, it is not difffĳicult
to come away with the notion that one has arrived, morally, and therefore any striving is optional.
See for example, John Piper, The Future of Justifĳication: A Response to N. T. Wright (Wheaton:
Crossway, 2007), 171.
14 Stott, Cross, 186.
15 Stott, Cross, 186.
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Stott writes, “When God justifĳies sinners, he is not declaring bad people to be
good, or saying that they are not sinners after all; he is pronouncing them
legally righteous, free from any liability to the broken law, because he himself
in his Son has borne the penalty of their law-breaking.”16 Justifĳication is understood by Protestants to be a completely gracious gift of God. Plantinga, Thompson, and Lundberg explain, “Justifĳication therefore is entirely the act of God,
who forgives the believer’s sin on the basis of Christ’s substitutionary death
and views the believer as if she possesses the righteousness of Christ.”17 In other
words, human works have no place in the doctrine of justifĳication. Reliance on
works will lead only to condemnation.18
This understanding of justifĳication by God’s grace alone, however, does not
mean that good works should not be part of the salvation of the Christian. As
Plantinga, et al. point out, “traditional Protestant theology . . . has simply considered works to belong to a diffferent category, that of sanctifĳication, which
nonetheless is an inseparable and indispensable moment of salvation.”19 Sanctifĳication is “the process in the Christian life of becoming holy; the gradual and
life-long progression of being conformed in disposition and behavior to the
image of Christ through God’s grace.”20 The ultimate goal of this progression,
and therefore of humans, is union with God, or to put it in more biblical terms,
life in the presence of God. Like Plantinga, et al., Stott also makes clear the
indissoluble connection between justifĳication and sanctifĳication, while afffĳirming that works belong in the category of sanctifĳication.21 Contra The Council of
Trent, reflected in Pieper’s comments, Protestants do have a place within salvation for good works. Unfortunately, it is not always clear exactly how the
works of sanctifĳication fĳit the larger picture of salvation, or for some authors,
whether efffort on our part is even required for sanctifĳication. While Reformed
theology is by no means monolithic on this subject, there is broad support for
the thought that sanctifĳication is a process in which humans cooperate with
the grace of God.

16 Stott, Cross, 190.
17 Richard Plantinga, Thomas R. Thompson, and Matthew D. Lundberg, An Introduction to
Christian Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 327.
18 Plantinga, et al., Introduction, 327.
19 Plantinga, et al., Introduction, 329.
20 Plantinga, et al., Introduction, 598.
21 Stott, Cross, 186.
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Cooperative Grace in Reformed Thought
From a Reformed perspective, perhaps no one is more eloquent in outlining the contours of salvation than John Calvin. Given his status in Reformed
thinking, he also provides a good starting point for examining the place of
human works in salvation. Calvin gives a helpful picture of the intimate relationship between justifĳication and sanctifĳication, as well as outlining what the
believer’s role in sanctifĳication is. Calvin speaks of salvation in terms of a “double grace.”22
He describes one part of the double grace as “that being reconciled to God
through Christ’s blamelessness, we may have in heaven instead of a Judge a
gracious Father.”23 This grace is that of justifĳication. Justifĳication is “the main
hinge on which religion turns,” according to Calvin.24 He understands justifĳication as a judicial declaration by God which forms the basis of one’s acceptance.
God has, because of Christ’s sacrifĳice on their behalf, pronounced guilty sinners ‘not guilty,’ and counts those who are in Christ not as enemies of his kingdom, but at peace with God, counted as God’s children.25 Justifĳication is God’s
declaration of one’s righteous status or innocence before God, and the forgiveness of sins.26 Justifĳication happens completely apart from human works.27
Humans are declared righteous because of Christ’s work on their behalf. But
Calvin also makes clear that this declared righteousness of believers is not
identical with moral perfection.28 Becoming a new creature is a process associated with sanctifĳication.29
Sanctifĳication or repentance is the second type of grace.30 Calvin writes that
Christians are “sanctifĳied by Christ’s spirit” and so “aspire to integrity and purity
of life.”31 Calvin makes clear that although justifĳication and sanctifĳication are
22 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.11.1, ed. John T. McNeill, trans., Ford Lewis
Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960). Unless otherwise indicated I will use the Battles
translation of the 1559 Institutes.
23 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.1.
24 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.1.
25 Romans 5:1; Rom. 8:16.
26 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.2-3.
27 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.6.
28 Calvin, Institutes, III. 11.3-4. See also Randall C. Gleason, John Calvin and John Owen on
Mortifĳication: A Comparative Study in Reformed Spirituality (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 56.
29 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.6.
30 I will generally use the term “sanctifĳication” to refer to this other grace. Calvin, however,
seems to use regeneration, repentance, and sanctifĳication almost synonymously.
31 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.11.1. trans. Henry Beveridge, vol. 2 (Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1863); Ioannis Calvini, Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Guilielmus Baum, Eduardus
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distinct in how they operate, they cannot be separated from one another. “The
grace of justifĳication,” writes Calvin, “is not separated from regeneration,
although they are things distinct.”32 What is not as clear in Calvin regarding
this distinction between justifĳication and sanctifĳication is the necessity for
human striving or cooperation in the grace of sanctifĳication. Sometimes Calvin
writes as if sanctifĳication is something conferred on believers by God, with no
action on their part. For example, he explains “that repentance is a singular gift
of God I believe to be so clear from the above teaching that there is no need of
a long discourse to explain it.”33 Just a few paragraphs earlier, however, Calvin
writes about the need to strive throughout life toward repentance. “We must
strive toward repentance itself, devote ourselves to it throughout life, and pursue it to the very end if we would abide in Christ.”34 So does Calvin see the
believer as a passive recipient of sanctifying grace or as one who cooperates
with that grace?
It seems that Calvin wants to hold God’s grace and human action in sanctifĳication in some tension. Randall Gleason points out that some of Calvin’s language “stresses the passive role the believer plays in being conformed to
Christ.”35 This emphasis on God’s initiative could be misleading and is, perhaps, where Pieper’s misunderstanding originates. It could be understood from
Calvin that God sanctifĳies and the believer simply waits around with the expectation of becoming more Christ-like. Or perhaps Christlikeness is simply
infused into the believer with no efffort whatsoever needed on her part.
Despite Calvin’s afffĳirmation of the initiating role of God’s grace in sanctifĳication, however, Calvin’s discourse on the Christian life should put to rest any
notion that the Christian’s role is one of passivity.36 He writes at one point, for
example, “Only let us look toward our mark with sincere simplicity and aspire
to our goal; not fondly flattering ourselves, nor excusing our own evil deeds,
but with continuous efffort striving toward this end: that we may surpass ourselves in goodness until we attain to goodness itself.”37 Calvin is clear that we
are not alone in this efffort, but work in reliance on the Holy Spirit. Nonetheless
he is equally clear that we must work.
Cunitz, Eduardus Reuss, volume II (Brunsvigae: Apud C. A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1864), column
533, “deinde ut eius spiritu sanctifĳicati innocentiam puritatemque vitae meditemur.”
32 Calvin, Institutes, III.11.11.
33 Calvin, Institutes, III.3.21.
34 Calvin, Institutes, 3.3.20.
35 Gleason, Calvin, 57.
36 Calvin, Institutes, 3.6-9.
37 Calvin, Institutes, 3.7.5.
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But even before the section on the Christian life Calvin writes that the very
thought of standing before the judgment seat of God, where every word and
deed will be accounted for, “will not permit the miserable man to rest nor to
breathe freely even for a moment without stirring him continually to reflect
upon another mode of life whereby he may be able to stand fĳirm in that
judgment.”38 Just a few paragraphs later he writes about the difffĳiculty of putting
the old self to death and recognizes this as a continual process.39
Gleason writes about Calvin’s doctrine of mortifĳication, “God’s grace does
not prevent the believer’s involvement in sanctifĳication, but in fact makes his
participation possible by enabling him to struggle efffectually against sin and
progress successfully towards conformity to Christ.”40 Thus, although Calvin
may at times be ambiguous, his overall teaching afffĳirms the necessity of human
striving in sanctifĳication. Indeed, Calvin writes that he chose to describe sanctifĳication before justifĳication because “it seemed of more consequence fĳirst to
explain that the faith by which alone, through the mercy of God, we obtain free
justifĳication, is not destitute of good works.”41
Though Calvin may at times be unclear, later Reformed theology took pains
to clarify. Justifĳication and sanctifĳication continue to be understood as inseparable yet distinct. But sanctifĳication, unlike justifĳication, is clearly understood
as that part of salvation in which humans cooperate with God. Francis Turretin
in his Institutes of Elenctic Theology makes a distinction between the fĳirst
moment of conversion and the ongoing work of conversion that conforms one
to the image of God. While Turretin afffĳirms that humans are passive in the fĳirst
moment or stage of conversion, this is not true of what he calls the second
stage of becoming more Christ-like. In this second stage Turretin writes that
the Christian “is not merely passive, but cooperates with God (or rather operates under him). Indeed he actually believes and converts himself to God; while
being acted upon, he acts; and being regenerated and moved by God, he moves
himself to the exercise of the new life.”42 Turretin recognizes a form of cooperative grace in the work of sanctifĳication.
Several other examples should sufffĳice to demonstrate that the notion of
sanctifĳication as a grace with which Christians cooperate is not unknown in
Reformed theology. In distinguishing between justifĳication and sanctifĳication
38
39
40
41
42

Calvin, Institutes, 3.3.7.
Calvin, Institutes, 3.3.8-9.
Gleason, Calvin, 58.
Calvin, Institutes, 3.11.1. trans. Beveridge.
Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, Vol. 2, 15.5.2.
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Heinrich Heppe, a 19th century Reformed theologian, notes that sanctifĳication
has its root in justifĳication.43 However, whereas justifĳication is purely God’s
activity in humans, sanctifĳication requires cooperation. He writes, “The former
[ justifĳication] is a once-for-all act of God imparted in the same way; the latter
[sanctifĳication] is a gradual process variously completed according to the varying measure of the Spirit which the individual receives. In the former man’s
relation to the grace that sanctifĳies him is purely passive; in the latter he cooperates with it.”44
Herman Bavinck also afffĳirms the inseparability yet distinction between justifĳication and sanctifĳication. Although, like Calvin, Bavinck at times sounds as
though sanctifĳication is something God does apart from us, in his discussion
of what he calls “passive” and “active” sanctifĳication he makes clear that Christians cooperate with God in sanctifĳication. After afffĳirming that sanctifĳication
is a gift of God and therefore in some way passive, Bavinck goes on to explain
that it is “not exhausted by what is done for and in believers.”45 Unlike Heppe,
he does not speak specifĳically of cooperation. Nonetheless, Bavinck insists
that “people themselves are called and equipped to sanctify themselves and
devote their whole life to God.”46 In that he links this tightly to God’s work
within the believer, cooperation with the Spirit in sanctifĳication would not
be a misinterpretation of how Bavinck understands what he calls earlier an
“obligation” of Christians.47 Sanctifĳication is, according to Bavinck, both “God’s
all-encompassing activity and our responsibility.”48
Louis Berkhof also writes of both the distinction between justifĳication and
sanctifĳication and the necessary link between them. With regard to sanctifĳication Berkhof afffĳirms the necessity of God’s initiating action in Christians for sanctifĳication. “God only,” he writes, “can be called the author of
conversion.”49 But he goes on to stress that humans are not passive in the work
43 Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1950), 565.
44 Heinrich Heppe, Dogmatics, 565-6.
45 Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics,Vol. 4, Holy Spirit, Church, and New Creation, ed. John
Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 253.
46 Bavinck, Dogmatics, Vol. 4, 253.
47 Bavinck, Dogmatics, Vol. 4, 236. Bavinck is speaking here of what he calls the “holy life.” He
asserts that Christians are both “obligated” to live a holy life and that they “owe it to God.” One
could hardly argue that Bavinck has a passive sense of how sanctifĳication works based on
statements such as these.
48 Bavinck, Dogmatics, Vol. 4, 253.
49 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: New Combined Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996),
490.
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of sanctifĳication. With reference to the Biblical use of the Hebrew word for
turning or conversion, he afffĳirms the importance of human cooperation with
God in conversion. He writes, “But though God is the author of conversion, it is
of great importance to stress the fact, over against a false passivity, that there
is also a certain co-operation of man in conversion.”50 Like Heppe, Berkhof is
not shy of actually identifying sanctifĳication as something in which humans
cooperate with God’s grace.
From an early reformer to later theologians, these examples demonstrate
that at least in Reformed theology, passivity with regard to sanctifĳication is not
commended. Contra Pieper’s understanding of Protestant theology, striving in
cooperation with the Holy Spirit in sanctifĳication is part of the overall package
of salvation by grace alone. But what about the practical problem that Pieper
rightly points out? How can theology help people understand that striving
toward Christlikeness is not works-righteousness but rather a necessary part of
salvation? Understanding the theological virtue of hope as the proper disposition for sanctifĳication may offfer a valuable means toward this end.

The Virtue of Hope
As mentioned in the introduction, hope is one of the virtues Thomas Aquinas
identifĳies as a theological virtue. Virtues are not, as modern culture would suggest, mere respectability. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McClusky, and
Christina Van Dyke, in their work on Aquinas’s ethics, help elucidate virtue as
understood in the Thomist tradition. “Virtues,” they write, “are the sorts of habits that both perfect human nature and in so doing also properly order their
actions to their ultimate end.”51 Virtues are habits or dispositions that have
taken root in a person. As DeYoung explains, “Virtues are ‘excellences’ of character, habits or dispositions of character that help us live well as human
beings.”52 As such, they should be understood as the ground from which behaviors sprout rather than particular behaviors themselves, and they offfer a framework for recognizing what underlies certain behaviors.53 Virtues are generally
50 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 490.
51 Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics:
Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context, (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2009), 132.
52 Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and Their
Rewards, (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), 14.
53 DeYoung, Vices, 16-19.
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acquired or strengthened by practice until the disposition becomes second
nature to us.54 DeYoung et al. go on to distinguish between four kinds of virtues
as identifĳied by Aquinas: intellectual virtues, moral virtues, four cardinal virtues, and the three theological virtues: Faith, hope and love. Each type is related
to the capacity it is intended to perfect.55
Although the natural virtues can be acquired by practice, the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love are only available as gracious gifts infused
in the regenerate by the operation of the Holy Spirit.56 “Infused virtues,” writes
DeYoung in reference to the theological virtues, “are created in the soul by the
direct action of God.”57 They are not acquired by practicing their characteristic
traits.58 Terence Penelhum writes that the theological virtues “are due to a special infusion of grace, and do not derive from any natural aptitude in us in the
way that the natural virtues do.”59
This idea that faith, hope and love are given to humans by God actually
arises from Scripture. Aquinas cites 1 Corinthians 13 as the Biblical authority for
identifying hope as a theological virtue.60 He argues that the habit of hope
flows from grace alone.61 Aquinas seems to simply be recognizing that faith,
hope, and love are identifĳied by Paul as spiritual gifts, that is, gifts that come to
the believer from God. Although there is a tendency not to think of them in
these terms, Paul treats faith, hope, and love as gifts in the same sense that
speaking in tongues and prophecy are gifts. In fact, he closes out his discussion
of the spiritual gifts by noting that faith, hope, and love are the greatest, and
most enduring spiritual gifts without which the other gifts are rendered nearly
useless.62
54 DeYoung et al., Ethics, 147.
55 DeYoung, et al., Ethics, 137.
56 DeYoung, et al., Ethics, 145. For a more complete treatment of the diffferences between the
types of virtues and the role of the Holy Spirit in infusing the virtues please see DeYoung’s
explanation, pp. 147-47. Grace, as she points out, is not attached only to the theological virtues,
but is operative in the other virtues as well. This notion of faith, hope, and love as gifts of the Spirit
arises directly from Scripture. Paul closes out his discussion of spiritual gifts in 1 Cor. 12 and 13 by
stating that the greatest gifts of all are faith, hope, and love (1 Cor. 13:13).
57 DeYoung, et al., Ethics,143.
58 DeYoung, et al., Ethics, 143.
59 Penelhum, “Analysis,” 135.
60 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (S.T. in future citations), II-II, 17, 5.
61 Aquinas, S.T., II-II, 17, 1.
62 This seems obvious not only from Paul’s statements about the uselessness of the gifts apart
from love earlier in the chapter, but also from the fĳinal verse (v. 13) where Paul identifĳies this triad
of gifts as “remaining” while the other spiritual gifts will not (v. 8-10). Additionally, although this
text is the one Aquinas cites in his discussion of the virtues, it should be noted that these three
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Like all the theological virtues, hope strives not toward the end of natural
happiness, but toward supernatural happiness.63 This end is what distinguishes
hope as a theological virtue from certain secular notions of hope.64 The specifĳic
good to which hope orders human living is, according to Aquinas, “eternal life,
which consists in the enjoyment of God himself.”65 The aim of hope, in other
words, is happiness or blessedness in God. Because this ultimate good will not
be fully realized in this life the human condition must be understood, according to Pieper, as ‘being on the way.’66 In other words, humans have not and will
not fully experience enjoyment of God or perfect beatitude in this life but recognize themselves as pilgrims trusting God for assistance in reaching that end.
Thus, Aquinas emphasizes that hope entails both the ultimate end of eternal
happiness (enjoyment of God), and trust in God’s assistance for obtaining
that end.67
Although hope as a theological virtue is understood as a gift of grace, this
does not mean that it cannot be developed. On the contrary, we are expected
to develop this virtue. “Once God gives us a virtue,” writes DeYoung, “it is up to
us to act on it.”68 The point of understanding hope as a gift of grace is that hope,
like faith and love, is not something one can call up and develop apart from
God. For example, one cannot just wake up one day and decide to work on
being more hopeful. Both the initiative and development of the virtue hope
come from God. Furthermore, as Pieper points out, humans will not even recognize hope as a virtue apart from God’s revealing grace.69
Even though hope is infused by God, it can nonetheless be derailed in
two distinct ways. First, despair can squelch hope. Aquinas actually identifĳies despair as a movement away from God and therefore, a sin.70 Pieper elucidates Aquinas’ description, calling despair “a perverse anticipation of the
gifts are frequently listed by Paul, both together and separately, as characterizing the life of the
believer. See, for example, Romans 5:1-5; 1 Thess. 1:3; 1 Thess. 3:6; 1 Thess. 5:8; Eph. 5:5-6.
63 Aquinas, S.T., I-II, 62.1.
64 There is debate about how secular and theological hope relate to one another particularly
with regard to the end to which they order human actions. Specifĳically, Dominic Doyle has
suggested that despite the distinction between secular and eschatological hopes, there is a
connection between them. See Dominic Doyle, “Spe Salvi on Eschatological and Secular Hope: A
Thomistic Critique of An Augustinian Encyclical,” Theological Studies 71 (2010): 350-379.
65 Aquinas, S.T., II-II, 17.2.
66 Pieper, Faith, 100.
67 Aquinas, S.T., II-II, 17, 2 and 7.
68 DeYoung, et al., Ethics, 144.
69 Pieper, Faith, 100.
70 Aquinas, S.T., II-II, 20, 1.

Downloaded from Brill.com02/18/2022 03:44:43PM
via Calvin University and Seminary

M. L. VandenBerg / Journal of Reformed Theology 6 (2012) 99-114

111

nonfulfĳillment of hope.”71 The despairing person loses sight of the end in one
way or another and gives up on striving. William Mann writes, “despair is the
abandonment of hope, a kind of turning away from God that results when salvation is deemed to be beyond the reach of the sinful creature.”72 “Despair,”
writes Nicholas Lash, “stays paralyzed, deadened by impotence and guilt.”73 At
its core, despair doubts that God can or will carry through on his promises.
The other way that hope can be sent offf the tracks, the aggressive form of the
sin, is presumption. Like despair, Aquinas identifĳies presumption as a sin.74
Pieper writes that presumption, like despair, is a perverse anticipation—
“a perverse anticipation of the fulfĳillment of hope.”75 Presumption is not a condition of having too much hope. Rather, presumption, like despair, is a lack of
hope. In the case of presumption however, the lack of hope stems from the
belief that one has already arrived at the goal in some way or is fully capable of
achieving the goal by one’s own effforts. Thus, according to Mann, “presumption is a rejection of hope as unnecessary, either because one presumes that
salvation is within one’s own power or because one presumes that God’s mercy
will save even those who are unrepentant.”76 Presumption takes the ‘not yet’
out of hope. It thinks it has already attained the future good. Presumption fails
to regard earthly existence as a condition of ‘being on the way.’77 In fact, both
presumption and despair deny the pilgrim character of the Christian life either
by thinking one cannot arrive at the promised goal, or that one has already
arrived.
In summary, the virtue of hope is understood to be a gift that is infused in
the Christian by grace. The hopeful person recognizes herself as being on the
way toward blessedness and enjoyment of God, but not yet having arrived at
that goal. As with any virtue, hope must be practiced to be strengthened and
developed. Thus, hope is characterized by striving in keeping with the recognition that one is ‘on the way.’ But this is not striving done in isolation or in fear.
Even as hope is initiated by the grace of God, so it must be developed in cooperation with God’s grace. Thus, the Christian cooperates with God’s grace to
71 Pieper, Faith, 113.
72 William E. Mann, “Hope,” in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of
Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 276.
73 Nicholas Lash, “Hoping Against Hope or Abraham’s Dilemma,” Modern Theology 10 ( July
1994): 244.
74 Aquinas, S.T., II-II, 21, 1.
75 Pieper, Faith, 113.
76 Mann, “Hope,” 276.
77 Pieper, Faith, 125.
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develop the virtue of hope. With this description in mind, I will show how hope
is the proper virtue or disposition for sanctifĳication and that works of sanctifĳication actually develop hope.

A Proposed Synthesis between Sanctifĳication and Hope
From a Reformed perspective, sanctifĳication is a work in which humans cooperate with the work of the Holy Spirit. We strive in cooperation with the Holy
Spirit toward the goal holiness. But perfect sanctifĳication is not achieved within
this lifetime. The Heidelberg Catechism, a confession afffĳirmed by many in the
Reformed faith, makes this clear. For example, the answers to questions 56 and
115 both indicate that striving and struggle toward Christlikeness characterizes
the Christian life, a struggle that question 115 states will not be over until “after
this life.”78 In addition, question and answer 42 indicate that one of the blessings of death is that it “puts an end to our sinning.”79 Thus, the Heidelberg
authors make clear that complete sanctifĳication is not a possibility for this life
in Reformed thinking. Sanctifĳication is something we already enjoy, but which
we also await. Christians are given the gift of sanctifĳication, but have not and
will not arrive at complete sanctifĳication, perfect holiness, within this lifetime
according to Reformed theology. In other words, the very nature of sanctifĳication is “already-but-not-yet.”
Like sanctifĳication, the virtue of hope is characterized by its “not-yet” nature.
Pieper writes, “Hope is one of the very simple primordial dispositions of the
living person. In hope, humans reach “with restless heart”, with confĳidence and
patient expectation . . . toward the arduous “not yet” of fulfĳillment, whether
natural or supernatural.”80 Ultimate fulfĳillment of hope rests in God alone,
something that can be experienced only partially in this life. Hope is characterized by the status of being ‘on the way.’ Pieper writes that “man fĳinds himself,
even until the moment of his death, in the status viatoris, in the state of being
78 The Heidelberg Catechism, (Grand Rapids: CRC Publications, 1988). Question 56 asks, “What
do you believe concerning “the forgiveness of sins”? It answers, “I believe that God, because of
Christ’s atonement, will never hold against me any of my sins nor my sinful nature which I need to
struggle against all my life.” (emphasis mine). Question 115 asks, “No one in this life can obey the
Ten Commandments perfectly: why then does God want them preached so pointedly?” The
second part of the answer is, “so that while praying to God for the grace of the Holy Spirit, we may
never stop striving to be renewed more and more after God’s image, until after this life we reach
our goal: perfection.”
79 The Heidelberg Catechism, (Grand Rapids: CRC Publications, 1988).
80 Pieper, Faith, 100.
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on the way.”81 Like sanctifĳication, complete fulfĳillment of hope awaits the life
to come. This future orientation of hope gives it an eschatological, already-butnot-yet character similar to sanctifĳication.
In addition to the eschatological character of both sanctifĳication and hope,
both are also gifts of grace. As a theological virtue, hope is, in Thomist thinking,
an infused gift, not something available apart from the gracious initiative of
God. In Reformed thinking, sanctifĳication is also a gift of grace, a gift primarily
associated with the work of the Holy Spirit. Both gifts are understood as forms
of the sort of grace with which we cooperate. So what is the relationship
between these two concepts?
One way to picture sanctifĳication is through the image of dying and rising
with Christ, an image Paul uses in connection with baptism (Rom. 6:4). Calvin,
in his commentary on Romans, speaks of this dying and rising as a benefĳit of
union with Christ.82 This is not a one-time benefĳit, however. Dying and rising
is an ongoing process. Christians must strive to daily put offf the old sinful self.
Calvin writes, “It is indeed well with us if our flesh is continually mortifĳied.”83
Likewise, we must strive to rise daily to our new life in Christ. So just a few lines
later Calvin adds that “newness of life is to be pursued by Christians as long as
they live.”84 Furthermore, this ongoing process is both intentional and hard.
Calvin warns that this is warfare of sorts, and it takes our whole lives.85 It is
precisely this ongoing, intentional dying and rising that hope addresses.
If dying and rising is the basic rhythm of sanctifĳication, hope is the virtue or
character trait that keeps that rhythm in tempo. The Christian life is a journey.
Christians are a pilgrim people, a wilderness people working toward perfect
holiness and enjoyment of God, but delayed in fully achieving that goal. The
temptations of the journey are numerous. The road of sanctifĳication is difffĳicult
and potentially painful. Like Israel in the wilderness, sometimes life in Egypt
looks much better than the hope of promised future blessedness.86 The disposition of hope sets the pace for the journey toward the goal of holiness; it
attacks the temptation to turn back to our former way of life in despair of ever
reaching the goal, of ever being good enough. But hope also keeps us from presumptively thinking that we are already good enough, or that this striving is
81 Pieper, 92.
82 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, trans. and ed.
Rev. John Owen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 222-23.
83 Calvin, Romans, 226.
84 Calvin, Romans, 227.
85 Calvin, Institutes, 3.3.9.
86 Numbers 14:1-4.
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something we must do on our own—that justifĳication is by grace alone and
sanctifĳication is by us alone.
One who cultivates the virtue of hope will be reminded that progress in
sanctifĳication is not optional. The twin dangers of presumption and despair
threaten to derail this progress. As Pieper writes, “One who looks only at the
justice of God is as little able to hope as one who looks only at the mercy of
God.”87 The virtue of hope, with its afffĳirmation that Christians are people who
are “on the way,” keeps sanctifĳication moving forward toward the goal of holiness and enjoyment of God. People of hope are those who recognize that they
are saved by grace. They are justifĳied by grace alone once and for all. They are
already sanctifĳied and yet continue to be sanctifĳied by grace that cooperates
with human striving. As one of my colleagues has described it, the Christian in
this life has been saved, is being saved, and will be saved.88
The virtue of hope, a virtue infused by the gracious initiative of God with
which we cooperate, reminds us that we are not alone on this journey. Progress
in sanctifĳication is not beyond the reach of sinners because it is, as Paul says,
cooperation with God who is working in us (Phil. 2:12b-13). We will not arrive
in this lifetime, but we must never give up striving.

Conclusion
The Protestant tendency to downplay the role of works in the economy of salvation is largely due to a misunderstanding of the cooperating grace of sanctifĳication. The Thomist understanding of hope offfers Prostestants a framework
for keeping sanctifĳication properly oriented toward the goal of holiness, stalling neither in the direction of presumption nor despair. Hope-fĳilled sanctifĳication characterizes the already-but-not-yet nature of the Christian life by
afffĳirming both God’s ongoing work of making us holy, and our cooperation
with that work.

87 Pieper, 128.
88 I am indebted to my colleague Dr. Lyle Bierma at Calvin Theological Seminary for this
phrase.
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